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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
It is submitted that the instant case leaves the law completely unsettled
and furnishes no guide for district judges, litigants, and attorneys. A
definitive, authoritative ruling must some day be made. When an appro-
priate case again arises, the court should have no trouble in determining
that the application of the doctrine is within the inherent power of the
court.
ROBERT G. ANDERSON
DISCRETIONARY DECISION OF A STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY WILL
BE SUSTAINED IF BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Baker Sales Barn, Inc. applied to the Montana Livestock Commission
for a "certificate of public convenience and necessity" authorizing the
licensing of a livestock market at Baker, Montana, under the appropriate
Montana statutes. After a hearing the commission denied the application,
concluding that the applicant failed to show the requisite public conveni-
ence and necessity. On appeal the district court set aside the commission's
denial and ordered the certificate to issue. The court reviewed the evidence
presented to the commission and found that the commission had acted
capriciously and arbitrarily and had abused its discretion. On appeal to
the Montana Supreme Court, held, reversed. Under the Montana statute
permitting an appeal from a decision of the Montana Livestock Commission,
the courts will not interfere with the commission's factual determination,
if based on substantial evidence.' Baker Sales Barn, Inc. v. Montana Live-
stock Commission, 367 P.2d 775 (Mont. 1962) (Justice Doyle specially
concurring, and Justices John C. Harrison and Adair writing separate
dissenting opinions).
The instant decision recognizes what is commonly referred to as the
"substantial evidence" rule for determining the evidentiary validity of an
administrative decision.' The rule first appeared in a 1912 decision by
'The Montana statute permitting an appeal from a decision of the Montana Live-
stock Commission is § 46-917 of the REvS-r CODES OF MONTANA, 1947. This section
provides in part: ". . The trial shall Ie held summarily before the district court
upon the record of the evidence presented to the commission of which a complete
record must be kept of the hearings of the commission as shown by said transcript
and the exhibits, if any, presented to the commission and . . . upon which its de-
cision was rendered and there shall not be any additional evidence introduced or
anything in the nature of a trial de novo. The court shall not substitute its discre-
tion for that of the commission but shall determine whether the commission and
whether it acted according to law."
The district court held this statute unconstitutional because it did not provide
for a trial de novo. The supreme court declared, "[The district court] did not need
to go into any constitutional question [because it could have decided the case on
other grounds] and under the familiar rule announced many times we shall not go
into constitutional matters unless it is considered necessary to a decision on the
merits." Instant case at 779. The supreme court, however, after reversing the
district court's decision on the merits failed to answer the respondent's original
contention that the appeal statute is unconstitutional. It can be assumed that, by
finding against the respondent, the supreme court impliedly answered the question
in the negative, i.e., the statute is not unconstitutional.
'In interpreting the appeal statute, the court said, "The statutes confer, whether
wisely or unwisely, the original discretion. in the Commission. Such Commission
is made up, presumptively at least, of men of experience in the field regulated, and
when their discretion is exercised based upon substantial evidence, as it was here,
that discretion should not be interfered with by the courts." Instant case at 782.
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RECENT DECISIONS
the United States Supreme Court, ICC v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.' The
rule, as originally stated, was simple in form but proved to be grossly
inadequate as a guide for a reviewing court.! Subsequent to this decision,
however, in an effort to establish certainty in the scope of review, numerous
attempts have been made to describe the quantum of evidence necessary to
constitute "substantial" evidence.
The difficulty in applying this seemingly simple test can be traced to
two principle causes: 1) legislative failure to clarify the extent to which
judicial review of an administrative decision is authorized, and 2) judicial
attempts to define this expression with terms that are themselves unde-
finable.' The latter merely compounded the shortcomings of the former,
thereby resulting in ambiguity rather than certainty.
Two statements of the United States Supreme Court regarding sub-
stantial evidence merit particular attention. In Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB' Chief Justice Hughes said, "Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable man might ac-
cept as adequate to support a conclusion.' Later, during the same term
of court, in NLRB v. Columbian Enaameling & Stamping Co.,' Mr. Justice
Stone clarified the term further by stating that substantial evidence means
evidence "affording a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in
issue can be reasonably inferred .... [I]t must be enough to justify, if the
trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought
to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.' These statements are often
cited as being consistent with the intent of Congress regarding review of
administrative decisions." In these two cases, the Court seems to adopt
the substantial evidence test used in the review of jury verdicts." T~his
test, because of its nearly uniform application, is to be preferred to the ab-
stract definitions which have been attempted in other cases. The Adminis-
'222 U.S. 541 (1912).
'"[The Commission's] conclusion, of course, is sulbjet to review, but when supported
by evidence is accepted as filal : not that its decision. involving as it does so many
and such vast public interests, (an Ie snpport(,d by a mere scintilla of proof-but
the courts will not examine the facts further thatn to determine whether there was
substantial evidence to sustain the order." 222 U.S. at 547.
"E.g., "more than a mere scintilla." Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1936) ; "induce conviction," "make an impression on reason," "cause
one considering the evidence to arrive at a fixed conviction," NLRB v. Thompson
Products, Inc., 97 F.2d 13, 15 (6th Cir. 193S) : "adequate proof," "concientiously
find," Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1950) ; "rational basis,"
Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 112 F.2d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 1940).
6305 U.S. 197 (1938).7 1. at 229.
8306 U.S. 292 (1939).
'Id. at 300.
1A statement of the Attorney General, appended to the Senate Report, explained
that the Administrative Procedure Act was intended to embody the law of these
cases. § 10 (e) of appendix B of S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong. Also see Davis,
ADmINISTRATIVE LAv 118 1958).
'Montana has applied the reasonable vian test to jury verdicts since 1934. The test
established in Morton v. Mooney, 97 Mont. 1, 11, 33 P.2d 262, 265 (1934), was re-
cently applied by the court in Win Del Ranches, Inc. v. Rolfe and Wood, Inc., 350
P.2d 581, 584 (Mont. 1960). Substantial evidence on which a jury verdict must be
based so as to preclude the Supreme Court from disturbing the verdict on appeal,
is evidence, "such as will convince reasonable men and on which such men may not
reasonably differ as to whether it establishes the plaintiff's case ... " Morton v.
Mooney, 97 Mont. 1, 11, 33 P.2d 262, 265 (1934).
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trative Procedure Act,' as construed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Uni-
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, has added the concept of looking to the
whole record," to determine whether the evidence is substantial, rather than
just to the evidence which supports the agency's decision.
A fusion of these three opinions suggests the following test: Substan-
tial evidence exists when and only when, after a review of the record as
a whole, it can be said that a reasonable man viewing the evidence includ-
ing the inferences which may be drawn therefrom, could agree with the
conclusion reached by the agency."
Implicit in the "reasonable man" test is the recognition that a reason-
able man sitting on an administrative tribunal would not necessarily reach
the same conclusion that lie would reach if he were sitting on a jury, when
presented with the same factual situation. Members of an administrative
tribunal are often and ordinarily selected because of their particular
knowledge of matters in the field regulated. They not only possess, but
are also expected to use this expertise in evaluating the evidence presented.
Some findings rest on judgment or discretion or policy, which in turn rests
on the kind of facts that are not necessarily susceptible of proof." On the
other hand, a juror may or may not have special knowledge with regaxd
to the subject matter being litigated. Even if he does have such knowledge,
he is to try the case on the evidence adduced, and not upon his personal
knowledge."
Although the term "substantial evidence" has appeared in Montana
decisions reviewing the factual determinations of administrative agencies
for a period of forty-one years, the term is as uncertain and ambiguous as
it was when first used. The rule made its first appearance in Montana in
Billings Utility Company v. Public Service Comimission," wherein the su-
preme court declared, "The [reviewing] court has not the power to substi-
tute its judgment for that of the commission, nor can it set the commission's
conclusions aside when they have been made lawfully and reasonably, within
125 U.S.C. §§ 1(t)1 to 1011 (1958).
1340 U.S. 474 (1950). "The substantiality of evidence must take into account what-
ever in the record fairly detracts from its weight .. . .Congress has merely made
it clear that a reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision
when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is
substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnished, in-
cluding the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view." 340 U.S. at 488 (1950).
""[T]his is not the same thing as saying that every page must be read. One party
normally points out the evidence supporting the finding and the other normally
points out the evidence detracting from the finding; by relying on the parties'
sifting the judges may often review quite conscientiously without reading the entire
record." 4 DAvis, ADIMINISTRATiVE LAW 130 (1958).
' This is not a test which has been applied by any court. It is, however, similar to
the following test which was proposed by Dean Stason in 1941. "ITIhe term 'sub-
stantial evidence' should be construed to confer finality upon an administrative
decision on the facts when, upon an examination of the entire record, the evidence,
including the inferences therefrom, is found to be such that a reasonable man, act-
ing reasonably, might h'ave reached the decision: but, on the other hand, if a rea-
sonable man, acting reasonably, could not have reached the decision from the evi-
dence and its inferences then the decision is not supported by substantial evidence
and it should be set aside. Stason, "8ubstantial Evidence" in. Administrative Lawe,
89 U.1A. L. 11Ev. 1026, 1038 (1940-41).
112 DAVIS, ADMINNISTRATIVE LAW 471 (1958).
"Do ing v. Farmers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 158 Iowa 1,138 N.W. 917, 919 (1912).862 Mont. 21, 203 Pac. 366 (1921).
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the proper sphere of authority.,," The Montana court then adopted lan-
guage from ICC v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,' the first United States
Supreme Court case enunciating the rule.
The substantial evidence rule, thus established, was not applied again
by the Montana court until 1933 in Fulmer v. Board of Railroad Commis-
sioners." In that case the court was satisfied with the orders of the Board
when it found that those orders "were based upon substantial evidence." '
During the twelve year period between these two decisions the Montana
court, ignoring the substantial evidence rule, resorted to a variety of tests,
including wholly inadequate'.. and "honestly arrived at.'"
Adding to the uncertainty of the term in Montana is a 1954 case'
wherein the court leaves the reader wondering whether the substantial evi-
dence test is to be applied by the agency in reaching its decision or by the
reviewing court in determining whether the agency's decision should be
allowed to stand. In concluding that certain carriers had not shown the
necessity for a rate increase, the court declared, "The proper time for the
carriers to justify their request for increased rates by satisfactory and sub-
stantial evidence was at the hearing on their application which was then
being considered. "' In 1957 the court had two opportunities to clarify
the term, but instead, chose only to reiterate what they had said in the
past. In State ex rel. Olsen v. Public Service Commission' the court said,
"The rule is that if there be substantial evidence sustaining the order of
the board, the courts will not interfere with its conclusion."' In another
rate case, ' decided during the same term, the supreme court stated that it
must approve the action of the trial court in affirming the order when
" [a] reading of the transcript and the order of the. Commission demon-
startes that there was substantial evidence to support its findings. "'
The statement that an agency's order will be sustained if supported
by substantial evidence is useful for one purpose only, that of settling the
controversy then before the court. This statement adds nothin toward the
solidification of administrative review in Montana. The court has failed
to give the expression the definiteness of content that courts, administra-
tive agencies, litigants, and practitioners need in order to achieve the cer-
tainty which is necessary to avoid futile appeals.
The uncertainty referred to above is clearly illustrated by the various
opinions in the instant case. The district court apparently did not have
the substantial evidence rule in mind when it reviewed the record, and
rendered its decision. It is not clear whether that court, in reversing the
commission, independently found that the weight of evidence supported
the applicant, or whether it failed to find substantial evidence to support
19Id. at 35, 203 Pac. at 368.
'222 U.S. 541 (1912), discussed supra at note 3. See also supra note 4.096 Mont. 22, 28 P.2d 849 (1933).
21I. at 39, 28 P.2d at 855.2'Interstate Transit Co. v. Derr, 71 Mont. 222, 232, 228 Pac. 624, 628 (1924).
'State ex rel. Schoonover v. Stewart, 89 Mont. 257, 275, 297 Pac. 476, 481 (1931).
2Freight Rate Ass'n v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 128 Mont. 127, 271 P.2d 1024 (1954).
"Id. at 133, 271 P.2d at 1027.
'131 Mont. 104, 308 P.2d 633 (1957).
"Id. at 110, 308 P.2d at 636.
"State ex rel. Olsen v. Public Service Comm'n., 131 Mont. 272, 309 P.2d 1035 (1957).
old. at 280, 309 P.2d at 1040.
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the commission's decision.' Neither of the dessenting justices seems to base
his opinion on substantial evidence. Mr. Justice John C. Harrison con-
cluded that the district court had "sufficient'' or "ample"' evidence to
overturn the decision of the commission. Mr. Justice Adair concluded that
the district court had "ample''' evidence to warrant its reversing the com-
mission. The majority decision, representing the opinion of two of the
justices, concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the
commission's decision, but left unanswered several fundamental questions.
First, what standard did the court use in determining the substantiality of
the evidence. Was the court satisfied with a "mere scintilla," or did it
require a "preponderancd" of the evidence, or did it apply some standard
within these limits?' Second, did the court conclude that the evidence
,was substantial merely by looking at the evidence which supported the com-
mission's decision, or did it look to the record as a whole? Third, what evi-
dence did the court find which it concluded was substantial? These are
questions which must be resolved before any measure of certainty can be
achieved.
The federal courts have continuously attempted to establish uniformity
and definiteness in the scope of judicial review of administrative decisions.
The Montana court, on the other hand, has made little, if any progress to-
ward achieving this goal. Perhaps uniformity has not been attempted be-
cause the Montana court has determined that it must retain complete discre-
tionary power to tailor the scope of review according to the particular
agency involved and factual situation presented. If this premise is incor-
rect, or improper, it is then submitted that a single comprehensive test,
regardless of how broad or how narrow it may be, must be formulated and
adopted before any degree of certainty will be achieved. A possible solu-
tion is the "reasonable man" test, suggested above.
KEIT'lt W. McCURDY
8'The district court concluded that the testimony clearly indicated that the applicant
had shown that the proposed market met both the requirements of public conveni-
ence and public necessity and. therefore the commission had acted capriciously.
arbitrarily, and abused Its discretion'by not granting the certificate. Instant case
at 777.
"Instant case at 783.
'Instant case at 784.
3'Instant case at 786.
'The quantum of evidence which the term "substantial evidence" can be used to
describe was summarized in Osage Nation pf Indians v. United States, 97 F. Supp.
381, 387 (Ct. Cl. 1951). The court noted that the expression has been judicially
construed as meaning everything from "warrant in the record," "rational basis,"
"not arbitrary," "some evidence," "reasonable," to what is commonly understood as
being "the preponderance of the evidence."
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